Abstract. A number of security models have been proposed for RFID systems. Recent studies show that current models tend to be limited in the number of properties they capture. Consequently, models are commonly unable to distinguish between protocols with regard to finer privacy properties. This paper proposes a privacy model that introduces previously unavailable expressions of privacy. Based on the well-studied notion of indistinguishability, the model also strives to be simpler, easier to use, and more intuitive compared to previous models.
Introduction
RFID tags are small microchips with an antenna attached, usually embedded within a plastic or paper package. Tags communicate wirelessly when interrogated by an RFID reader. The readers are much larger computing devices which are normally networked to a back-end database. RFID tags are starting to be commonly used for supply-chain and inventory applications to replace the existing barcode systems. Other applications of RFID tags include traffic transit, building and vehicle access, payment cards and national passports.
The last ten years have witnessed an explosion of interest in the area of radio frequency identification (RFID) security. The combination of mobility, wireless communications and low-power hardware presents unique security challenges in the design of authentication protocols, particularly with respect to ensuring privacy. Informally, in the context of RFID systems, privacy means that only authorised parties (tag readers) are able to identify and track RFID tags. Many RFID security models have been proposed in the past [2, 5, 17, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18] , however there is no commonly agreed "good" privacy model for analysing RFID protocols. As shown in the recent surveys of Chunhua et al . [6] and Coisel and Martin [7] , existing privacy models have significant limitations in terms of the classes of protocols that can be analysed within the models and the strength of the privacy notions considered, particularly in relation to the corruption of tags. This paper proposes a new privacy model for RFID that overcomes the limitations of existing models. The new model is simple enough so that it can be widely adopted for security analysis by protocol designers.
Stateful and Stateless Protocols. Proposed RFID protocols can be separated into two categories, stateless and stateful, depending on secret data management mechanism employed by the protocol. Stateful protocols are protocols which make use of updatable information stored in the tag, referred to as the state, whereas stateless protocols do not make use of any updatable state [1] . A state typically consists of secrets that are used for tag authentication and are updated when protocol sessions are completed successfully. Traditionally, stateful protocols have been considered to be more efficient but less private compared to their stateless counterparts, this is mainly due to the ability to rely on state updates for privacy features rather than solely on the encryption schemes implemented within the tag. However, stateful protocols can attain certain privacy notions that are otherwise unachievable. Naturally, their strengths and weakness should be reflected in a privacy model.
An example of the different properties between the two types of protocols is the vulnerability of stateful protocols to desynchronisation. Desynchronisation commonly occurs when the last message of the protocol is not received, blocked by an adversary for example, resulting in the internal state of one of the parties not being updated. Next time the tag and reader engage in a protocol run, either the protocol fails because of the non-matching states, or an additional resynchronisation stage is executed. Both cases are likely observable by a third party; therefore de-synchronisation may be seen as resulting in side-channel information leakage, which can be used by an attacker to trace the tag. A security model for stateful protocols must take into account desynchronisation. This vulnerability does not affect stateless protocols. The model presented in this paper introduces a new definition of stateful privacy, a notion that coexists with a stateless notion of privacy.
Reader Corruption. Existing security models for RFID authentication model readers and the back-end database as a single entity and assume that the reader and backend database are implemented securely, so that the adversaries cannot interfere with them. This assumption is based on the availability of greater resources for their protection. Typically the back-end database is at least a workstation-class system, which is hosted in a central physically secured location. As discussed by Avoine et al. [4] , assuming that the back-end database cannot be directly attacked is unwarranted in practice. After all, these are servers that are commonly connected to the Internet, where vulnerabilities and hacking attacks are commonplace. In the new model presented here, readers and the back-end database are also treated as a single entity, refered to as reader, but adversaries are afforded with corruption powers that expose the secrets in the back-end database. It must be noted that while Avoine et al. [4] discussed the importance of reader corruption, they do not consider it within a formal security model. Interestingly, it turns out that stateful protocols are naturally suited to resist attacks involving corruption of the reader.
Side-Channel Leakage. Traditionally, side-channel information refers to physically observable characteristics of a system, such as power consumption and heat, which can be used by an attacker to compromise security. Unfortunately most side-channel sources are independent of the underlying protocol and are difficult to include in a security model. The new model focuses on side-channel information which is dependent on protocols and is easily observed without sophisticated means. One notable example is the result of a protocol session, where the results of a protocol can be observed though physical means, e.g. a door opening. There has been other recent work showing that execution time can leak information [3, 9] . As it is likely that more aspects of side channel will be discovered in the future, it would be impractical to capture each distinct leakage scenario independently. The proposed model does not focus on any specific trait, but rather the main cause of side-channel information leakage: de-synchronization.
Contribution This paper proposes a new privacy model for RFID systems. Although the model is designed for passive RFID systems, it is capable of analyzing active systems. Thus it can be used for protocols that are initiated by the tag, and it does not limit the number of message rounds.
-The first distinct contribution of the model is the consideration of stateful protocols. While previous work typically considered stateless protocols to be stronger than stateful protocols, our results suggest that neither is always stronger than the other. Thus both types of protocols have their merits. -The second contribution is the introduction of reader corruption. In addition to allowing reader corruption, the model distinguishes between corruption of tag volatile and non-volatile memory, achieving previously unobtainable notions of privacy. This separation reflects the more sophisticated skills required to extract information from volatile memory than from non-volatile sources. Furthermore, two flavours of privacy, weak and strong, are defined, based on the ability of the adversary to corrupt challenge tags, which creates more meaningful expressions of privacy. -Lastly, the paper presents a stateful protocol based on the stateless publickey protocol of Vaudenay [18] highlighting the uniqueness of the stateful definitions.
Model components

RFID System
The setup of an RFID system is simulated using the following two setup algorithms:
On input of a security parameter rpd, outputs public/secret key pair rpk, rsk. In cases where public-key pairs are not utilized, rpk can be considered as an empty string (φ).
On input of identifier T and the reader's public key rpk, a secret K, and a public and private key pair (tpk, tsk) are generated. State S is initialized according to the protocol specification. K is a fixed long term secret, whereas S is an updatable secret. It is common for protocols to make use of only one of K or S; unused values are considered to be empty (φ). The values generated are stored by the reader and/or tag according to the protocol specification.
Definition 1 (Session).
A session is an instance of a protocol execution at a party. Each party stores a session identifier π for every initiated session which is unique within the party. When two session ids π R and π T refer to the same protocol execution, they are referred to as corresponding sessions. Each session also holds a Result value indicating if a session has completed or has failed.
Definition 2 (Active Session). Sessions are labeled as either active or inactive. It is only possible for a tag to have one active session at any point in time.
Volatile memory is assumed to be erased when a session is labeled inactive unless otherwise specified by the protocol. 1 It is possible for readers to have multiple active concurrent sessions with different tags.
Adversarial Oracles
As usual, the interaction between an adversary A and a RFID system is modelled by oracles that the adversary is allowed to query:
This oracle models the situation where an adversary is eavesdropping on the communication between the reader and tag T . A receives the protocol execution transcript t with the corresponding session identifiers π T and π R .
A completed acknowledgement will be stored as Result if the protocol run was successful, otherwise failed will be stored.
A initiates a protocol session with either with both tag T and reader R, or only T or R, returning the new corresponding session identifiers π R and π T or only session identifiers π T or π R . Any previous sessions of T or R, and corresponding sessions are marked as inactive. If Result of the previous session is not labeled, it will be labeled as f ailed. Unlike the Execute oracle, this oracle allows the adversary to create an incomplete an session between a reader and/or a specific tag.
A retrieves the value of Result of protocol session π. If there is yet to be a value of Result, φ is returned.
Sends message m to session π T of tag T. A is returned a response message r or φ as per protocol specification. In normal protocol interactions a response message r would be returned, however there is also the possibility of a 'null' response φ if the message sent was invalid, or the session had already completed or failed. This oracle models the ability of the adversary to send messages to RFID tags.
-r/φ ← SendReader(π R , m) Sends message m to session π R of the reader R. A is returned a response message r or φ as per protocol specification. Similar to the SendTag oracle, in normal protocol interactions a response message r would be returned, however there is also the possibility of a 'null' response φ if the message sent was invalid, or the session had already completed or failed. This oracle models the adversary transmitting a message to the RFID reader.
A obtains the long term secret K and session state S of T. Note that we assume that tags will continue to function after corruption. This oracle models the adversary's ability to extract secret data from a tag through specialized methods such as physical extraction.
The adversary is given the memory state M of tag T. M is the contents of the temporary(V olatile) memory of T used when computing the output of SendTag(π T , T ). For example, this can include input and output of values of hash functions and any generated/received nonce depending on protocol specification.
This query invokes a protocol-specific function F that determines if T and R are in sync. This oracle models side-channel leakage of information due to de-synchronized states. This oracle is aimed at stateful protocols where it is possible for the updatable states to be out-of-sync. Stateless protocols always return Y.
A obtains all information, including secrets, stored by R. This oracle models the ability for an adversary to obtain a snapshot of the database by compromising the back-end system.
Adversary Classes
We consider the following classes of adversaries, depending on the oracle queries they have access to:
Passive adversaries can only eavesdrop on communications between parties and are not able to communicate with the tag or reader. Thus they are allowed access to the Execute oracle, but not to the Initiate, SendTag and SendReader oracles. Active adversaries can not only access the tag but also the reader. Thus they can access all four oracles Execute, Initiate, SendTag and SendReader. Destructive adversaries are not allowed to interact with tag T after calling CorruptTag(T ). This class of adversaries is similar to the destructive adversary defined in [18] . Wide adversaries are not allowed to access the oracle Result to determine whether a protocol session was successful or not. A wide adversary corresponds to a real life attacker who may be unable to interact with protocol parties to observe the outcome of the protocol (e.g. whether a door opens). Adversaries are assumed to be wide unless otherwise specified. Narrow adversaries are allowed to access the oracle Result to determine whether a protocol session was successful or not, representing attackers which are close by the tag and the reader it interacts with. Corrupt 1 (C1) adversaries are those who have access to the oracles CorruptTag and Sync. They represent adversaries knowledgeable in the area of RFID technology in particular the internal workings of an RFID tag. Corrupt 2 (C2) adversaries are those who have access to oracles CorruptMemory and CorruptReader. They represent adversaries with different skill-sets than Corrupt 1 where specific knowledge of RFID might not be required but are capable of compromising different aspects of the system.
Note that not all types of adversaries are exclusive of each other. Thus, for example, we consider adversaries that are passive and C1, passive and C2, and so on. A noteworthy distinctionwith respect to previous models is that corruption powers are considered to be independent powers that can be possessed by any adversary type rather than abilities of strictly more powerful adversaries. A summary of the types of adversaries is given in table 1. 
Privacy definitions
Privacy notions are defined based on two games played between the adversary A and a challenger C. The first game applies to stateless protocols, whereas the second one applies to stateful ones.
Stateless Game:
Phase 1 -Tags, T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T n and reader R are simulated by C.
-A interacts with C via oracle queries.
-T i and T j are reassigned as T a and T b respectively if c = 0, else T i and T j are reassigned as T b and T a . Phase 2 -A interacts with C though all oracles except for Sync, CorruptTag, and CorruptMemory on T a and T b .
Stateful Game:
In the Stateful privacy game, an extra oracle, BlindExecute, is introduced and used by C at the start of Phase 2.
A protocol session is executed between tag T and reader R with no output. This oracle models situations where a tag communicates with the reader in the absence of an adversary. The execution of the oracle is the same as Execute only with no output. In schemes where either or both parties store a previous secret for re-synchronization purposes, BlindExecute might be required to be called more than once for a scheme to remain private. However this additional requirement reduces the privacy provided by the scheme.
Phase 1 Same as in stateless game. Phase 2 -BlindExecute(T a ), BlindExecute(T b ).
-A interacts with C through all oracles.
-A stops interacting with C and outputs c .
-A wins if c = c.
Definition 3 (Strong/Weak Game).
A game is said to be Strong if during P hase 1 the oracles CorruptTag(T i /T j ) and/or CorruptMemory(T i /T j ) has been called, for either one or both of the challenge tags, T i , A non-Strong game is otherwise a Weak game.
Since the Strong game requires the use of corruption oracles, the notion is not applicable for Active and Passive adversaries. Because Strong privacy implies Weak privacy, it is assumed that a game is Strong unless otherwise specified.
Definition 4 (Privacy).
A scheme is said to be A-G Private, if for any adversary of class A ∈ {Wide, Narrow} × {Passive, Active, Destructive} × {φ, C1, C2, C1+ C2} playing privacy game G ∈ {Weak, Strong} × {Stateless, Stateful} have a winning probability of 
Comparison and Results
Comparison with Previous Models
A survey of proposed RFID models was recently conducted by Coisel et al. [7] who discussed the advantages and disadvantages of current models before selecting five protocols to be compared. The survey discussed features which should be considered useful in future models. Most notable is the ability for an adversary to choose and corrupt challenge tags, the differentiation between Narrow and Wide adversaries, the ability for the adversary to play with all tags in the system, and the ability for the model to analyze all protocols. The model presented in this paper not only considers all the said abilities in addition to a novel notion of privacy, but does so without compromising flexibility.
Of particular concern was the conclusion of Coisel et al. [7] that none of the models was able to distinctively identify the privacy differences between the protocols. The difference between tree-based and SK-protocols was shown to be the most difficult to distinguish. Thus this section uses the same five protocols as a baseline for comparison with other models and shows that the proposed model can distinguish between all five. However due to space constraints, not all full proofs will not be shown. A summary of the results can be found in table 2.
Protocol Results
SK-Protocol
Weak Active+C1 Stateless
Active Stateless PK-Based Active+C1 Stateless 
SK-Based Protocol
This well-known protocol begins with the reader generating a random nonce N R . The tag, after receiving N R , generates its own nonce N T and uses a pseudorandom function to generate the message H(K N R N T ), where K is a unique secret of the tag. The reader than has to compute the same message for all secrets stored until a match is found, completing the protocol.
Theorem 1. The SK-based protocol shown in Figure 4a is Weak Active+C1 Stateless Private.
Proof (Sketch):
By simulating the pseudorandom function H a random oracle ensures that it is infeasible for an adversary to obtain K from H(K N R N T ). Given that K is randomly distributed, and that the key space |K| is sufficiently large, the advantage of the adversary is: P r|A Adv| = 1 |K|−# of CorruptTag calls .
OSK Protocol
The OSK protocol makes use of two second pseudorandom functions, H and G. Every time the tag receives a random nonce N R from the reader, the secret state S is updated with G. For each authentication attempt, the reader has to compute H(G i (S ), N R ) for every tag in the system. Theorem 2. The OSK protocol [14] shown in table 3a is Weak Active+C1 Stateful Private if the number of consecutive f ailed sessions at T a /T b < δ, otherwise the scheme is Weak Passive+C1 Stateful Private.
Reader Tag Assuming that secrets S are chosen uniformly at random, the scheme can achieve Weak Privacy. Using a similar setup to the proof for SK-based protocol, there would be an additional random oracle G. Evidently the scheme would not be Strong private, since by obtaining S at any point in time will allow the adversary to obtain all subsequent updates of S though G. However, the reverse is not true.
As it is possible to desynchronize the protocol beyond re-synchronization if the number of consecutive failed sessions at a tag is less than δ, by bounding the number of failed sessions it is possible for the scheme to be Weak Active+C1 Stateful Private. Without this bound the scheme would otherwise be Weak Passive+C1 Stateful Private.
O-FRAP The Optimistic Forward-secure RFID entity Authentication Protocol (O-FRAP), shown in table 3b, was proposed by Le et al. in [17] , and can be referred to for a more detail description on the computation of v 3 . In general, the reader using N R (ID, K, S), or previous values (ID −1 , K −1 , S −1 ), re-computes v allowing it to check the values of v 3 . A pseudorandom function F is used in the protocol, where the output v from input K, N R , S is separated into four sections v 1 , v 2 , v 3 and v 4 .
Reader Tag 
Proof (Sketch):
As it is possible to desynchronize the protocol with an active adversary [15] , the scheme cannot be Active-Stateful private. However, assuming a passive adversary, even when the adversary has knowledge of (ID, K, S) and ID −1 , K −1 , S −1 , it is not possible to associate the secrets with the challenge tags after two calls of BlindExecute. Thus the protocol is Passive+C1+C2 Stateful(2) Private.
Tree-based Protocol The tree-based protocol is proposed by Molar et al. [13] and is very similar to the SK-based protocol shown in table 4a. Instead of each tag sharing a single unique secret with the reader, however, each tag shares a unique set of secrets. The secrets are also shared among tags, thus the corruption of a tags can lead to compromise of uncorrupted tags.
Theorem 4. The tree-based protocol is Active Stateless Private
Proof (Sketch):
The proof is similar to that of the SK-protocol described in section 4a, only in tree-based protocols the corruption of a large number non-challenge tags would allow the adversary to win the Weak Active+C1 Stateless Private with nonnegligible advantage. Thus the protocol can only achieve Active Stateless Privacy. However, if given a bound on the number of times CorruptTag can be called, Weak Active+C1 Stateless Privacy can be achieved. The protocol shown in table 4b is presented by Vaudenay in [18] . The protocol uses a public-key pair rsk and rpk. 
Public Key Protocol
Proof (Sketch):
The proof follows very similarly to that shown in Theorem 6. The only minor difference is the omission of the PUF, thus the resulting adversarial advantages will be the same.
Other Results
Impossibility of Stateless Protocols to Achieve Strong-Stateful Privacy This section describes an attack within the any Strong-Stateful game that allows the adversary to trivially win thus showing the impossibility for stateless protocols to achieve any notions of Strong Stateful privacy. The adversary A proceeds as follows:
Evidently A wins with probability 1. The above attack assumes a C1 adversary, however, a similar attack can be launched for a C2 adversary using CorruptReader.
Reader Tag rsk, IDR, ID
Fig. 1: Active+C1 Stateful Private Protocol
Stateful Public-Key Protocol The scheme shown in Figure 1 is a stateful protocol using both public-key and a Physical Unclonable Function PUF. A PUF is a hardware pseudorandom function which is unique to each tag, thus it is not assumed to be public. After each successful protocol execution, the state S is updated.
Theorem 6. Scheme in Figure 1 is Active+C1 Stateful Private if (EN C rpk , DEC rsk ) is CCA2 secure.
Proof:
The section will show that using an adversary that can win the Stateful Active+C1 Game with non-negligible advantage, it is possible to construct an adversary that can break CCA2. In the proof 2 games are played by 3 parties: the challenger, C, CCA Adversary, A CCA and A Game , an adversary that can break the Active+C1 Game with non-negligible advantage. A CCA2 game is played between C and A CCA , and a Stateful Active+C1 Game is played between A CCA and A Game . To model the Physical Unclonable Function(PUF), a random oracle is simulated by the challenger, only that A does not have direct access to this oracle.The PUF is simulated by the challenger where on input a value s i ∈ R {0, 1} γ , generate and returns a unique random value o i ∈ R {0, 1} χ . Values s i and o i are then stored on a table. All values of s and o are to be unique within the table. On the event that a previous s j is used as input, the previously assigned o j is returned. As only C has access to PUF, there are no oracles that allow A to interact with the PUF.
To begin the proof, SetupReader(rpd) is executed, followed by the execution of SetupTag(T) p unique times, where p ≥ 2. R is also stored in the database, BlindExecute would need to be called twice for the protocol to be private. The remainder of the proof remains identical to the one above.
Discussion, Conclusion and Future Work
Recently concerns were raised in the ability of current RFID models to capture various privacy properties. It is suggested that current models do not offer sufficient notions of privacy need to analyze the privacy differences in proposed protocols. The model proposed in this paper not only aim to address the concerns raised, but also novel notions of privacy not offered in current models. By offering a new corruption model, the ability for reader corruption and a stateful notion of privacy, the model introduces both stronger and weaker notions of privacy compared to current models. Extending on the analysis from Coisel et al. [7] the model was able to distinguish the privacy properties of the five protocols, which was not possible in the eight chosen models.
This paper also presents a stateful protocol based on Vaudenay's public key protocol capable of achieving the strong notion of Active+C1 Stateful and Destructive+C1+C2 privacy. Due to space constraints, however, little has been presented on notions of privacy involving reader corruption, and there has been little discussion on the weaker notions of privacy. Also open is the problem of achieving the strongest notions of privacy, namely Active+C1+C2 Stateless and active+C1+C2 Stateful privacy. But as the Active+C1 notion of privacy is likely to require public-key cryptography, such protocols are unlikely to be practical for RFID. Nevertheless, the model is capable of analyzing said protocols when the need arise. Finally, it would be of interest to further explore the privacy implications between different levels of strong and weak privacy and between stateful and stateless privacy.
